5 de agosto de 2014

Sobre racionalistas, liberalismo y religión

Recientemente Adam Kotsko escribió un post sobre las actitudes de los racionalistas como Dawkins y sus seguidores respecto al islam (luego extendió la crítica a los aceleracionistas, algo que no considero del todo adecuado, pero esa es otra historia). En resumen, el punto es que los racionalistas (en especial a los que a mi gusta llamar los "ateos de internet") tienden a ver a los que practican el islam como un grupo de seres irracionales que no quieren entender que la razón es lo mejor para ellos.
Una consecuencia de este tipo de debates es que por lo general llevan a argumentos tipo "ah, pero seguro te opones a *conducta atribuida a ultras*" por parte de los racionalistas liberales. Como nota Kotsko:


Esto me recordó un crítica sobre el liberalismo que Zizek viene repitiendo desde hace tiempo (literalmente, lo repite tal cual en varios artículos):
"The difference between liberalism and the radical Left is that, although they refer to the same three elements (liberal center, populist Right, radical Left), they locate them in a radically different topology: for the liberal center, radical Left and Right are the two forms of appearance of the same “totalitarian” excess, while for the Left, the only true alternative is the one between itself and the liberal mainstream, with the populist “radical” Right as nothing but the symptom of the liberalism’s inability to deal with the Leftist threat. When we hear today a politician or an ideologist offering us a choice between liberal freedom and fundamentalist oppression, and triumphantly asking a (purely rhetorical) question “Do you want women to be excluded from public life and deprived of their elementary rights? Do you want every critic or mocking of religion to be punished by death?”, what should make us suspicious is the very self-evidence of the answer – who would have wanted that? The problem is that such a simplistic liberal universalism long ago lost its innocence. This is why, for a true Leftist, the conflict between liberal permissiveness and fundamentalism is ultimately a false conflict – a vicious cycle of two poles generating and presupposing each other. One should accomplish here a Hegelian step back and put in question the very measure from which fundamentalism appears in all its horror. Liberals have long ago lost their right to judge. What Horkheimer had said should also be applied to today’s fundamentalism: those who do not want to talk (critically) about liberal democracy and its noble principles should also keep quiet about religious fundamentalism."
Y esto no se trata de "oh, tolerémonos unos a los otros". Esto se trata de luchar juntos, como bien dice Zizek:
"I don't believe in tolerance, I believe in the proper good intolerance. Let's say we and muslims. Fuck it. I don't want to tolerate them or them to tolerate me. I want to share our struggle with them. We are fighting here, they are fighting there. The only hope of universality is if we discover our struggle is the same at some level."

tl;dr: no, no quiero una sociedad ultrareligiosa, pero tampoco quiero un racionalismo liberal.

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